Meaning, autonomy, symbolic causality, and free will by Abbott, Russ
Meaning, Autonomy, Symbolic Causality, and Free Will
Russ Abbott
California State University, Los Angeles
As physical entities that translate symbols into physical actions, computers offer insights into the nature
of meaning and agency. Physical symbol systems, generically known as agents, link abstractions to
material actions. The meaning of a symbol is defined as the physical actions an agent takes when the
symbol is encountered. An agent has autonomy when it has the power to select actions based on internal
decision processes. Autonomy offers a partial escape from constraints imposed by direct physical
influences such as gravity and the transfer of momentum. Swimming upstream is an example. Symbols
are names that can designate other entities. It appears difficult to explain the use of names and symbols
in terms of more primitive functionality. The ability to use names and symbols, that is, symbol grounding,
may be a fundamental cognitive building block. The standard understanding of causality—wiggling X
results in Y wiggling—applies to both physical causes (e.g., one billiard ball hitting another) and
symbolic causes (e.g., a traffic light changing color). Because symbols are abstract, they cannot produce
direct physical effects. For a symbol to be a cause requires that the affected entity determine its own
response. This is called autonomous causality. This analysis of meaning and autonomy offers new
perspectives on free will.
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This article is divided into six parts. This introduction provides
a roadmap. It also explains why it makes sense to discuss com-
puters in an article in a psychology journal.
Section two discusses how computers construct meaning. I use
a player piano to illustrate an approach to meaning that is widely
used in computer science: a symbol’s meaning is the physical
action(s) the system takes on encountering it.
Section three introduces autonomy. Autonomy requires one
energy flow to control another. A standard light switch illus-
trates how one energy flow, the energy that flips the switch, can
control another, the current in a circuit. But not all such situa-
tions imply autonomy. A system consisting of a switch, a
circuit, and a light source has no autonomy. For an entity to
qualify as having autonomy it must contain both the controlling
and controlled energy flows. Under this definition, the player
piano introduced in section two can be understood as having a
limited form of autonomy.
In preparation for a discussion of how symbols can act as
causes, section four examines the longstanding question of what a
symbol is. That section also examines the ability of biological
organisms to work with categories, concepts, and individuals. The
section suggests that these abilities may be three aspects of a
widespread cognitive capability: an ability to work with cognitive
entities.
Section five reframes the earlier discussion of autonomy in
terms of symbols and causality.
The final section examines the implications of the preceding
sections for free will.
Why Discuss Computers in a Psychology Journal?
Newell and Simon (1976) characterize computers as physical
symbol systems. As physical devices computers act in the material
world; in addition, computers manipulate symbols. This joint
capability is fundamental to how symbols get meaning.
The definition of meaning outlined in section 2 will link
symbols to actions. Doing so requires a bridge between the
abstract and the physical. A physical symbol system provides
that bridge. A corollary is that any entity, including human
beings, capable of giving meaning to symbols must be a phys-
ical symbol system.
A second reason to include a discussion of computers is their
transparency. Technology does not yet enable one to follow in
detail the functioning of human (or animal) brains, much less their
minds. The man-made nature of computers mitigates that problem.
Even so, it may not always be feasible to explain how the detailed
functioning of a computing system produces its higher level re-
sults.
How Computers Transform Symbols to Meaning
This section presents a simplified version of operational seman-
tics (Fernández, 2014), a computer science approach to semantics.
I use the player piano as an example.
The modern equivalents of a player piano (electronic keyboards,
digital pianos, digital synthesizers, etc.) are physical symbol sys-
tems. They can read and manipulate symbols—in the form of
digitized musical scores—and transform them into sounds.
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Assume that the internal logic of a modern player piano is
expressed as software. That software includes commands to per-
form actions that produce sounds. An example might be an action
to strike selected strings with felt-clad hammers. (These com-
mands are similar to the more familiar print command, which
performs an action that produces output.) Assume those commands
are something like strike_C, strike_C#, strike_D, and
so forth. (For simplicity, I limit the discussion to a single octave.)
We can make up a simple notation for notes: C/4 means the
note C for a quarter note. Using this notation, the first four bars of
“Mary Had a Little Lamb” might appear as follows (the lyrics are
added for the reader’s convenience):
E/4 D/4C/4D/4E/4 E/4 E/2 D/4 D/4 D/2 E/4 G/4 G/2
Ma - ry had a lit - tle Lamb, lit - tle Lamb, lit - tle lamb.
Music is produced when our device reads such a score and
translates its symbols into physical acts.
How Symbols Are Converted to Actions
Converting symbols to actions sounds like an impossibility;
symbols are abstract, and actions are physical. Yet it is common-
place for computers to control physical devices on the basis of
symbolic computations. A player piano is such a device.
The software representing the player piano’s logic will consist
of two primary components. An outer layer iterates through the
score symbols. For each symbol it calls a subcomponent, perhaps
called play_score_symbol, to convert that symbol into an
action.
The job of play_score_symbol is to do whatever the
symbol given to it means. The body of play_score_symbol
might look something like the following (note that == tests for
equality):
if score_symbol == C then strike_C;
if score_symbol == C then strike_C#;
if score_symbol == D then strike_D;
. . .
In other words, for each score_symbol, perform the action
associated with that symbol. In doing so, the player piano gives
each score_symbol a meaning by linking it to a specific action.
Note how arbitrary the association of symbols with actions are.
Had play_score_symbol associated symbols with commands
to strike keys other than those shown, the symbols would have had
those other meanings—at least for this player piano.
One might object that these symbols have well-established
meanings independent of this player piano and that if play_
score_symbol had associated symbols with commands to play
notes that were not consistent with those well-established mean-
ings, play_score_symbol would be wrong.
I think that calling it wrong is not the best way to look at it; I
prefer inconsistent. To communicate, people must agree about
what symbols mean. There must be, as Baumeister and Monroe
(2014) would probably argue, a cultural aspect. If a symbol means
the same thing to multiple people, that is because they agreed to
make it have that meaning. But these cultural agreements do not
create the meanings. I doubt that anyone would argue that the
symbol C has a meaning independent of how people (or player
pianos) interpret it. A shared culture allows us to make the mean-
ing one person gives a symbol consistent with the meaning others
give that symbol. But I would not say that culture—absent the
people, if that is even meaningful—provides a meaning on its own.
In other words, the meaning is not “out there” waiting to be
discovered. It must be created by each individual—and then syn-
chronized among individuals so that they can communicate with
each other.
Actions Are Not Necessarily External
For a computer (or our player piano) to take an action does not
always imply that the action is evident to an outside observer.
Actions often change the internal state of the system. For example,
the discussion above ignored the time value of symbols. (Recall
that C/4 means a C for a quarter note.) We did not discuss how the
system treats quarter notes differently from, say, half notes. One
way for the system to do that would be to store, for each note being
played, the time duration over which the sound should be pro-
duced. Storing that information involves a change to the internal
state of the system. That too is a physical act. But it is not one that
an outside observer can easily see.
I selected a player piano as an example because much of what
it does results in externally observable actions (i.e., the production
of sounds). In contrast, most of the actions performed by most
computing systems involve internal state changes. These actions
are still physical: The physical state of the computer changes. But
these state changes are not easily observed from outside. Yet
making these internal state changes is part of a symbol’s meaning.
Operational semantics consist of just this: characterizing the
external actions and internal state changes that occur when a
symbol or symbolic construct is interpreted.
Autonomy
Although it may seem strange to say so, a player piano as just
described exhibits a simple form of autonomy. It determines,
through its internal logic, what a symbol means. A symbol cannot
force a meaning on the player piano. The meaning of a symbol is
determined internally.
I realize how strange that may sound. But look again at the code
above. It is the code that selects for each symbol what the player
piano’s response will be. Contrast this with how a billiard ball
responds when hit by another ball. The ball that was hit has no
choice about how to respond.
One might argue that the software inside a player piano is fixed
and that therefore the way the software interprets symbols is
fixed—so there is no room for autonomy. That, I claim, is another
question. Autonomy turns on whether an entity follows its own
internal rules, fixed or not.
The rest of this section examines autonomy in more detail.
Switches and Two-Level Energy Flows
Move a light switch to the on position, and an associated light
source (i.e., bulb, LED, etc.) emits light—assuming the circuit is
intact, the light source is functioning, current is supplied to the
circuit, and so forth. Move it to the off position, and the light
source stops emitting light.
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A switch has the crucially important property that it allows one
energy flow to control another. A light switch controls current in
a circuit. The energy used to flip the switch (i.e., the energy
expended by a person when flipping the switch) is not the same
energy flow as the energy in the circuit. Although not sufficient for
autonomy, this two-level mechanism is an important prerequisite.
It is worth stopping to appreciate the power of switches.
Switches enable human beings to use their own energy to control
devices they could not otherwise control. Much of civilization
depends on devices that are powered by nonhuman energy but
controlled by human beings. And of course the transistor, the
fundamental computer building block, is at heart a switch.
Switches and Autonomy
Switches do not on their own imbue something with autonomy.
Whether or not a light source emits light is controlled from outside
the light source. Neither the light source nor its circuit has anything
to say in the matter. Neither has the means to determine when the
switch is flipped. Autonomy arises when an entity includes
switches within itself and when it is organized to use those
switches to control the expenditure of its energy resources.
To make this point clearer, I will examine two biological ex-
amples, both involving E. coli cells. One does not involve auton-
omy; the other does.
François Jacob and Jacques Monod (Jacob & Monod, 1961)
famously discovered gene switches. For their work they were
awarded the 1965 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine. In E.
coli, genes involved with the metabolism of lactose are expressed
only when lactose is present. (The presence of glucose is also a
factor, but for our purposes that can be ignored.) The presence of
lactose (actually a byproduct of lactose) flips a switch for the
expression of the lactose metabolism genes.
The switch mechanism involves a protein (called a repressor),
which normally attaches to the DNA immediately prior to the
relevant genes. The repressor blocks RNA polymerase from read-
ing and transcribing the gene. When present, the lactose byproduct
attaches to the repressor and pulls it off the DNA. This unblocks
the RNA polymerase access to the genes. The genes are then read
and transcribed. This mechanism fits our switch pattern. The
presence of lactose unblocks the chemical energy that enables
RNA polymerase to crawl the DNA strand and read and transcribe
genes.
This mechanism does not reflect autonomy. There is no
decision-making process within the bacterium that controls the
expression of the genes. A gene switch is a chemical reaction that
functions in much the same way as a light switch. In effect, lactose
reaches into the cell and flips a switch.
In contrast I would credit E. coli with autonomy in how it
navigates a liquid nutrient-rich environment (see Hu & Tu, 2014).
Each E. coli cell moves through its environment by alternating
runs and tumbles. When the cell’s flagella rotate counterclockwise
a run occurs; the cell moves in a straight line. (The name notwith-
standing, E. coli flagella are stiff rather than whip-like; when
rotating counterclockwise they produce an outboard motor effect.)
When the flagella rotate clockwise a tumble occurs; the cell moves
randomly and reorients itself for the next run.
E. coli internal chemistry is capable of sensing a difference in
nutrient concentration between its front and rear. That difference
determines for how long a run persists. If the cell is moving along
a nutrient up-gradient, runs continue longer; otherwise, they stop
sooner. The cell then tumbles and reorients itself (randomly) for
the next run. The effect is to move the cell toward a nutrient
source.
This too is a switch. The chemical decision-making process is
one energy flow. It controls another energy flow, which powers the
flagella.
I credit E. coli with autonomy because it contains both the
decision-making process and the energy flow controlled by that
process.
Symbols
Consider the following line from the program snippet shown
earlier:
if score_symbol  C then strike_C;
Every word-like element in that line, “if,” “score_sym-
bol,” “”, “C”, “then,” “strike_C,” represents a symbol.
Recall that many of these appear multiple times in the program.
Each appearance of one of these elements represents the same
symbol. That raises two questions: (1) What does one mean by
“the same symbol?” (2) What is that “same symbol” entity? This
issue is not unique to computer science. The same question arises
in every academic discipline that uses symbols. If a symbol, say,
x, appears multiple times in a mathematical expression, it is
generally understood that each appearance represents “the same”
symbol.
The question of what a symbol is has a long philosophical
history. See, for example, Balaguer, 2016; Bricker, 2016; Floridi,
2017; Nelson, 2016; Orilia and Swoyer, 2016; and Reicher, 2016.
Space limitations preclude a review of this literature.
I find it useful to think of symbols as similar to names. For
example, consider the name John. One might find that name in a
baby name book. One might select that name for one’s own
baby—after which John, when used in the appropriate context,
refers to that child. The name itself, however, is independent of
any person. If two people are both named John, it is said that they
have “the same name.” No one seems confused by statements of
this sort. Yet I suspect it would be very difficult to provide a
rigorous completion for the sentence “A name is ___,” where the
blank is filled in by properties that characterize names.
Newell and Simon (1976) noted that a symbol has two proper-
ties: It can be manipulated as an entity, and it is capable of
designating something else. Names also have those properties—
although Newell and Simon do not note the similarity. This is what
Helen Keller realized in her flash of insight. She called it the
mystery of language. Things have names; names can refer to things
(Keller, 1903). Interestingly, Keller experienced her realization as
like a memory. “I felt a misty consciousness as of something
forgotten—a thrill of returning thought.” It is as if the ability to
connect names (or more generally symbols) to things comes built
into our brains.
I realize that in saying a symbol is a name, I have not solved the
problem of what a symbol is. I have only reformulated the question
to ask what a name is.
The question raised above of how to define the word name
begins to point toward an answer. A name is not defined by a set
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87MEANING, AUTONOMY
of properties; it is defined by how it is used. This is different from
many nouns: Fire, for example, can be defined by a set of prop-
erties. Virtually any term can be a name if it is used as a name, that
is, as a concise way to refer to something.
Concepts, Categories, and Individuals
I speculate that a wide range of organisms have the ability to
work with what might be called cognitive entities (such as con-
cepts, categories, and individuals) and that names and symbols
represent an advanced version of this basic cognitive ability.
Concept neurons. Quiroga (2012) has shown that humans
have “concept neurons.” (See also the discussion in Quiroga,
Fried, & Koch, 2013.) Originally called “Jennifer Anniston neu-
rons” and “Halle Berry neurons” (because both actresses were
used in these experiments), these neurons are triggered by a wide
range of pictures of their subjects, including full face, profile,
close-up, full body, and the subject dressed in various outfits. Even
more striking, the same neurons responded to the printed names of
these actresses! This suggests that these neurons were responding
to concepts, not visual patterns.
Concept neurons are also found in nonhumans. Both carrion
crows and rhesus macaques have neurons that respond to specific
numerical amounts. A particular neuron will respond to both one
dot and one beep. Another will respond to both two dots and two
beeps. Other neurons will respond to numeric values up to at least
four dots and four beeps (Ditz & Nieder, 2015).
Suggestive evidence of conceptualization. Loukola, Perry,
Coscos, and Chittka (2017) recently showed that bumble bees are
able to learn a task that seems to require conceptualization. To
obtain a reward, bees were required to move a ball to a target
location. Bees that observed another bee perform the task generally
learned the task faster.
The observation scenario involved three balls. The two closest
to the target were fixed in place. The demonstrator bee was thus
forced to move the most distant ball. When the observer bees were
tested, all three balls were mobile. The observer bees moved the
ball closest to the target. Loukola put it this way (Loukola et al.
2017, p. 836):
[T]he bees did not simply copy the behavior of the demonstrator but
rather improved on the observed behavior by using a more optimal
route.
These results suggest that bees may recognize ball as a category
and each of the balls as an instance of that category.
Other experiments also suggest animal conceptualization. In an
early language learning experiment a chimpanzee constructed the
lexigram sequence “coke that is orange” to request an orange soda
(Rumbaugh, 1977).
And then there is Alex, Irene Pepperberg’s parrot.
For 25 years, I have taught Gray parrots meaningful use of English
speech (e.g., to label objects colors, shapes, categories, quantities, and
absence). Using this code, my oldest subject, Alex, exhibits cognitive
capacities comparable to those of marine mammals, apes, and some-
times 4-year-old children. (Pepperberg, 2002, p. 83)
Alex could correctly answer questions about individual objects
such as “What color?” or “What shape?”, about comparisons
between objects such as “What’s different?” or “What’s same?”
[with respect to the properties color, shape, and size (large, small)],
and about collections of objects such as “How many?”. Alex was
even able to answer “none” to a “What’s different?” question if
there were no differences in the trained properties or to a question
such as “How many red blocks?” if there were no red blocks in a
given collection. (Pepperberg, 1999).
Categorization. One way to study conceptualization is
through categorization. Smith (Smith, Zakrzewski, Johnson, Val-
leau, & Church, 2016) provides a broad survey of animal catego-
rization capabilities. A wide range of nonhuman animals exhibit
categorization capabilities. Smith notes that
Categorization has conferred fitness advantages on vertebrates for
hundreds of millions of years. For example, vervet monkeys (Chlo-
rocebus pygerythrus) have developed call signs that warn group
members to behave appropriately at the sight of martial eagles (Po-
lemaetus bellicosus). (e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990) In a sense, these
calls denote or “name” members of the category eagle. (p. 1)
Since the call “names” a category, the category may function
very much like a concept.
Discrete entities. Implicit but often unmentioned in studies of
categorization is an ability to perceive discrete entities. After all,
what are categories other than ways to group discrete entities?
A number of experiments have tested animals’ ability to treat
entities as persisting over time.
• Many animals achieve full (i.e., Piaget stage IV) object
permanence (Gómez, 2005; Zentall & Pattison, 2016).
• Dogs (a) remained near a fallen owner, (b) avoided a
deceptive human, and (c) preferred a human that provided
valid information about the location of a reward over an
uninformative human (Roberts & Macpherson, 2016).
Abstractions
A wide range of animals have evolved the ability to work with
such cognitive entities as collections, concepts, individuals, names,
and symbols. I would go so far as to refer to this sort of capability
as an ability to form abstractions. Consider the significant fitness
advantage possessed by entities capable of responding to their
environment in terms of abstractions—such as friend versus foe,
food versus predator, danger versus safety, or nutritious versus
toxic—compared with those capable of responding only to raw
sensory signals (such as photon impacts). Given the enormous
fitness advantage that abstractions offer, it seems quite likely that
means for creating at least some forms of abstraction evolved not
long after the emergence of means for sensing the environment.
Since each sensing instance is likely to differ in some way from
every other sensing instance, what use is the ability to sense unless
one can form abstractions from signals and then act on the basis of
the abstraction?
The ability to use names and symbols to represent cognitive
entities—the symbol grounding problem—may be a primitive cog-
nitive building block (Harnad, 1990).
Symbols as Causes: Autonomous Causality
This section examines causality more carefully. Following are
two of the most widely used philosophical definitions:
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Physical causality (Dowe, 2000). A causal interaction in-
volves the transfer of a quantity of some conserved property from
one entity to another. The entity from which the conserved prop-
erty is transferred is considered the cause. The entity to which the
quantity is transferred reflects the effect of the transfer. A standard
example is a billiard ball. When a moving billiard ball hits a
stationary billiard ball, momentum is transferred from the former
to the latter. Although physicists might describe such an interac-
tion in more symmetric terms, human intuition is that the impact of
the moving billiard ball causes the originally stationary billiard
ball to move.
This approach to causation, while useful and convincing, is
limited to direct physical interactions.
Interventionist causality (Pearl, 2000; Woodward, 2003).
X has a causal relationship to Y if and only if there is a possible
intervention directed toward X that, in changing the probability
distribution of X, results in a change to the probability distribution
of Y. Interventionist causality attempts to capture the intuition that
if wiggling X results in Y wiggling, then X has a causal relation-
ship to Y. Another way of putting it is that X has a causal
relationship to Y if X can serve as something like a remote control
for Y. Interventionist causality characterizes most people’s intui-
tive understanding of causality.
Although interventionist causality requires that an empirical link
be established between the cause (wiggling X) and the effect (Y
wiggling), it does not require that one be able to explain the
physical mechanism through which the cause produces the effect.
Symbols as Causes
Intuitive as it is, interventionist causality implies what may seem
to be an unexpected result: Symbols can serve as causes.
1. A traffic light changing color causes traffic to stop or
start. When a driver sees a traffic light, she converts the
photons, that is, the physical elements received from the
world, into a symbol such as RedLight or GreenLight.
She understands that symbol and responds with some
physical action—pressing the brake or accelerator—
which in turn produces a physical effect on the vehicle.
2. Lowering or raising the price of an item causes more or
fewer of those items to be sold. A more complex series of
steps can be laid out for this interaction.
Causal interactions of this sort are so commonplace that we
hardly think about them. Yet pinning down the causal mechanism
produces some surprising results.
Autonomous Causality
Symbols have two defining properties.
1. They are abstract and cannot produce physical ef-
fects. As Rosen (2014) points out, abstract entities are by
definition causally inefficacious.
2. They have no distinctive individual properties. Sym-
bols are arbitrary and interchangeable. It sounds paradox-
ical, but (a) there is nothing distinctive about a symbol,
other, perhaps, than an arbitrary label; yet (b) each sym-
bol is distinguishable from all other symbols. (This does
not hold for names, which are often designed to have
aesthetic and semantic characteristics.)
A propertyless abstract entity such as a symbol would not seem
to be a promising candidate to serve as a cause. A symbol’s very
abstractness excludes it from causing a physical effect. Even if one
could get around this problem, since symbols have no individual
properties, there would seem to be no way for specific symbols to
produce specific effects. Yet we know that symbols serve as causes
and that different symbols—RedLight versus GreenLight—pro-
duce different effects. Similarly, each of our note symbols, C, C,
. . . , produces a different sound.
The issue of symbols as causes, sometimes known as mental
causation (Robb & Heil, 2014), has a long and vexing philosoph-
ical history. Yet at a common-sense level, there is no mystery.
Symbols serve as causes when they are interpreted by agents. It is
because of the way an agent interprets a RedLight that it means
“Stop” to that agent, and it is because of the way a player piano
interprets note symbols that they mean particular sounds.
Before going on I would like to look more carefully at the
preceding sentence. I wrote that a red light means “Stop” because
of the way an agent interprets it. I didn’t write that a red light
means “Stop” because that is its generally accepted, that is, cul-
tural, meaning. To understand the distinction consider the follow-
ing example.
Consider a company that builds an autonomous vehicle. The
vehicle’s software determines how it behaves on the road. Nothing
prevents the company from writing software that interprets a red
light to mean “Go.” Of course, it would be foolish for the company
to write software that interprets a red light to mean “Go.” Doing so
would likely ruin the company’s sales; it would open the company
to liability claims; and it might even result in criminal charges. But
it would not be impossible to write such software. Such software
would not change the culturally accepted meaning of a red light,
but it would determine the meaning of red lights for the vehicles in
which it was installed.
On the other hand, even a symbol’s culturally accepted meaning
can change. Suppose all companies wrote their software to inter-
pret a red light to mean “Go.” Suppose the laws were changed to
make going through an intersection with a red light legal and going
through an intersection with a green light illegal. Suppose all
drivers changed their interpretations of red and green lights ac-
cordingly. Presumably someone new to that society would decide
that the culturally accepted meaning of a red light is “Go.” (Some-
thing similar actually occurred. In 1967, Sweden switched from
driving on the left side of the road to driving on the right. Because
people were so cautious, there were fewer accidents than usual.
Accidents returned to their normal rate after two years; Flock,
2012).
Since the agent that interprets a symbol determines what the
symbol’s effect will be, I call this autonomous causality. Auton-
omous causality is a very strange notion, paradoxical even. As
indicated earlier, a billiard ball that is struck has no choice about
how it is affected. Momentum is transferred to it, like it or not. Yet
when a symbol “strikes” an agent—that is, when an agent encoun-
ters a symbol—how the agent responds depends on the agent
itself.
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89MEANING, AUTONOMY
When speaking of the physics of causation. Laplace (1814/
1951) famously said (emphasis added), “We may regard the pres-
ent state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its
future.” But with autonomous causality it is not quite that simple.
Instead of the laws of physics pushing the world around, agents
themselves determine how they will respond to symbolic causes.
The usual caveat applies: No laws of physics may be violated.
In short, an agent has autonomy when it uses internal rules to
determine how to respond to symbols.
Not all interpreters are as simple as our example player piano. A
jazz player piano may interpret a symbol to mean a certain note but
play a different but related note. Similarly, a human being, and
perhaps even an autonomous vehicle, may interpret a red light to
mean “Stop” but then make the further decision to go through the
intersection anyway. (How would you program an autonomous
vehicle to behave if (a) it were headed to a hospital with a
passenger with an emergency medical condition and (b) it came
upon a red light at an intersection with no cross traffic? I would
write the software to run the light after ensuring that there was no
cross traffic.)
How Difficult Is It to Forecast Agent Decisions?
If having autonomy means that an agent uses internal decision-
making processes to determine its behavior, how much can an
outside observer predict about those processes? Often not very
much.
Many agents are quite complex. Their internal decision-making
processes may be so complex that even if one knew all the relevant
details one might still not understand how they produce the results
they do.
Consider AlphaGo, the computer system that recently beat the
world Go champion (see Moyer, 2016 for a popular description).
AlphaGo’s design combines two multilayer artificial neural nets
with tree search (Silver et al., 2016). (Readers need not understand
these technologies to understand the implications of this example.)
An artificial neural net consists of a network in which the edges are
given weights that determine the extent to which the node at one
end effects the node at the other. The weights are determined
through machine learning techniques.
In the course of its development, AlphaGo examined millions of
Go games and played more millions of games against itself (Koch,
2016). In general, it is not possible to explain in any meaningful
sense what it means for a weight to have a particular value. One
can only conclude that the values that were arrived at work better
than others.
Neural nets are particularly opaque in this way. But even tradi-
tional software is often so logically complex (or contorted or
poorly documented) that one may not be able to explain how it
works. As a simple example, imagine software that uses the
Pythagorean theorem to compute the third side of a right triangle
and then uses that result to estimate the time required for a trip. If
the software includes the relevant arithmetic operations but with
no explanation for why those operations are being performed, one
may have difficulty explaining why the software estimates trip
times successfully. All an observer would see is a sequence of
computer instructions that perform arithmetic but might have no
idea what the intention of the programmer was when writing those
instructions.
The difficulty of understanding how agents make decisions is
compounded by the fact that agents may change. Many biological
organisms change (i.e., learn) as they experience their environ-
ments. Children go to school to learn effective ways to respond to
symbols. People study with the goal of improving their perfor-
mance. Society implements and publicizes policies that are in-
tended to deter certain behaviors. Although the effectiveness of
these practices varies from individual to individual, the effect is
that agents change their decision-making processes based on their
experiences.
Consider AlphaGo again. As it trained, it modified the weights
in its neural net. This is standard machine learning. More interest-
ingly, expert Go players were able to extract new strategies by
watching AlphaGo play.
AlphaGo has created a unique and extremely powerful approach to the
game of Go. [After] an exhaustive analysis of the five games between
AlphaGo and Lee Sedol and of three games AlphaGo played against
itself shortly before the match, . . . it became clear to us that AlphaGo
represents not only a scientific and technological advancement, but
also a milestone in human understanding of Go. Unconstrained by
human biases, and free to experiment with radical new approaches,
AlphaGo has demonstrated great open-mindedness and invigorated
the game with creative new strategies. (Hui, 2016, p. 1)
AlphaGo invented Go strategies that no human had consid-
ered—and presumably would not have predicted.
Much simpler examples illustrate similar phenomena. Consider
a database system. Presented with a query about information that
is not in its database, the system will not provide a useful answer.
But once that information is stored in the database, the same query
will return a more useful answer.
The point is that most entities have internal states that play a role
in the entity’s decision-making processes. Those internal states
may change. Often those changes occur as a result of interacting
with the external world. To know about them all, an observer
would need complete information about the entity’s history, which
generally is not available.
Autonomy consists of the ability of an agent to apply its
decision-making apparatus to symbolic information and then to
use the result to control how it behaves. Since most agents’
decision-making processes depend in part on the agent’s internal
state, and since an agent’s internal state generally depends on its
history, which is virtually impossible for an outside observer to
know in detail, no outside observer can be confident that it will be
able to forecast how an autonomous agent will behave.
Implications for Free Will
I will end by examining some implications for free will. Fol-
lowing is a paraphrased extract from physicist Sabine Hossen-
felder (2016):
According to our best present understanding, everything that happens
in our universe is due to four forces: gravity, electromagnetism, and
the strong and weak nuclear force. These forces conform to one of two
types of laws. One type is deterministic, which means that the past
entirely predicts the future. [This is the Laplacian universe mentioned
earlier.] There is no free will in such a law because there is no
freedom. (p. 1)
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The other type, which appears in quantum mechanics, has a random
component. But the randomness cannot be influenced by anything.
There is no free will in such a law either—just some randomness
sprinkled over the determinism.
These forces and the laws that characterize their physical effects have
been extremely well studied; they leave no room for free will. (p. 1)
Dispiriting as this may sound, Hossenfelder goes on to say that
these facts do not preclude one from making choices or decisions.
I will explain this in terms of the framework developed above.
People Interact With the World in Two Ways:
Physically and Symbolically
• We interact physically when we experience and are af-
fected by physical properties such as gravity, momentum,
temperature, and so forth
• We interact symbolically when we read, speak, listen to
others, or identify things we see, hear, touch, and so forth
It is the destiny of autonomous agents always to be mediating
between these two forms of interaction. Recall the automobile
driver. Her interaction with the world involved
a) the (physical) photons that entered her eyes;
b) the (symbolic) interpretation of those photons as a red or
green traffic light;
c) the (physical) forces to which she and her car are subjected;
d) the (symbolic) decision regarding how to respond to the
traffic light; and
e) the (physical) act of pressing the brake or the accelerator.
The two levels operate with distinctly different rules. The phys-
ical level operates according to the laws of physics. The symbolic
level operates according to internal information processing rules.
The symbolic level operates according to rules constrained in
part by logic and computer science. To take a classic example,
Turing (1937) proved that it is not possible to determine for an
arbitrary computer program whether it will ever stop. That ques-
tion, known as the halting problem, has nothing to do with the laws
of physics. Yet symbol processing as performed by both human
beings and computers is constrained by that result.
The broader conclusion is that laws apply at the symbolic level
that to not appear at the physics level. Here is how two Nobel prize
winners put it:
[L]iving matter, while not eluding the “laws of physics” . . . is likely
to involve “other laws,” [which] will form just as integral a part of
[its] science. – Schrödinger (1944/2012), p. 68
[The] workings of all the animate and inanimate matter of which we
have any detailed knowledge are . . . controlled by the . . . fundamental
laws [of physics]. . . . [W]e must all start with reductionism, which I
fully accept. [Even so, the] behavior of large and complex aggregates
of elementary particles is not to be understood in terms of a simple
extrapolation of the properties of a few particles. Instead, at each level
of complexity entirely new properties appear. – Anderson (1972), p.
393.
For additional discussion, see Abbott (in press).
Such a two-level perspective has been noted by a number of
philosophers. For example, Dennett (2003) writes (emphasis
added),
Nonhuman animals can engage in voluntary actions of sorts. The bird
that flies wherever it wants is voluntarily wheeling this way and that,
voluntarily moving its wings. (p. 48)
The aspects of a bird’s actions that Dennett refers to as volun-
tary correspond to actions I would describe as being directed by a
bird’s decision-making processes. I would describe birds as being
autonomous in that their behaviors derive from internal rules.
Neither Anderson, Dennett, Hossenfelder, nor Schrödinger would
deny that the internal decision-making processes also depend on
the forces of physics. After all they are physical activities and
hence subject to the laws of physics. Yet both Dennett and Hos-
senfelder find it useful to distinguish the direct forces of physics
from those that run an agent’s decision-making processes. (Neither
Anderson nor Schrödinger discuss this issue.)
These two manifestations of the forces of physics produce
different sorts of effects. Some forces of physics effect agents
directly in what I have referred to as a Laplacian manner. Some
forces of physics run agents’ decision-making processes and pro-
duce their effects indirectly as a result of symbolic processing. So
even though both manifestations obey the same physical laws, they
contribute to an agent’s behavior very differently.
As a simple example consider a railroad train. It is propelled
forward by energy generated by burning fuel. Yet its direction of
motion may be determined by a switch that controls which track it
will take. The energy required to control the switch is miniscule
compared to the energy that powers the forward motion. Both
forms of energy obey the laws of physics; they affect the train
quite differently.
What Is Free Will and Where Does It Fit In?
Dennett does not consider what he calls the voluntary actions of
birds to reflect free will. For him, autonomy appears not to be the
same as free will. But Dennett does talk about free will.
Humans differ from every other species in that we represent our
reasons to ourselves and others. This is what gives us the power, and
the obligation, to think ahead, to anticipate, to see the consequences of
our actions, to be able to evaluate those actions in the light of what
other people tell us, and to share our wisdom with each other. That’s
what makes us free in a way that no bird is free. . . . We have added
a layer on top of the bird’s (and the ape’s and the dolphin’s) capacity
to decide what to do next. . . . Your dog can be “asked” to do a variety
of voluntary things, but it cannot ask why you make that request. A
male baboon can “ask” a nearby female for some grooming, but
neither of them can discuss the likely outcome of compliance with this
request, which might have serious consequences . . . if the male is not
the alpha male of the troop. (p. 48)
For Dennett, free will consists of the ability to think ahead
before acting.
[Evolution produced] creatures capable of considering different
courses of action in advance of committing to any one of them, and
weighting them on the basis of some projection of the probable
outcome of each. In the quest by brains to produce a useful future, this
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is a major improvement over the risky business of blind trial and error,
since, as Karl Popper (1978) once put it, it permits some of your
hypotheses to die in your stead. (p. 45)
The ability to anticipate the consequences of actions and then to
make a choice based on that analysis offers significant advantages.
This, Dennett says, is the only kind of free will worth having.
Dennett does not say whether he would argue that computing
systems such as AlphaGo, which also select actions after analyzing
multiple possibilities, also have free will. Computers have played
games using what are called look-ahead strategies for decades. I
know of no one who has attributed free will to them.
Baumeister (Baumeister, 2014; Baumeister & Masicampo,
2010; Baumeister & Monroe, 2014) adopts a similar approach.
Free will is the ability to think things through before acting—
especially about things having to do with one’s social situation:
Culture includes systems that require people to follow rules, and so a
capacity for self-regulation according to rules would be very useful.
Culture is based on information, so the ability to communicate and
alter behavior on the basis of communicated information is important.
Rational choice would be highly useful to deduce implications for
action from abstract guidelines such as laws and moral principles, as
well as for functioning as an economic agent in a marketplace (an-
other vital aspect of culture). In both cases, and perhaps more gener-
ally, the ability to base actions on ideas is central to being a civilized
person. Developing the capacity to control action in this way presum-
ably comprised the key steps in the evolution of free will. (Baumeister
& Monroe, 2014, p. 12)
Even If We Have Free Will, Why Bother to
Exercise It?
I am not convinced that the preceding adequately characterizes
free will. But assuming that free will has to do with the ability to
think things through before acting, the question arises as to why
one should bother. After all, one’s thought processes are deter-
mined by the forces of nature. (They are performed by physical
materials, which must follow the laws of nature.) Therefore the
outcome of those thought processes are predetermined. Why spend
the time and energy to think?
Hossenfelder’s answer is that thinking is the way to answer a
question for which one does not yet have an answer. Suppose that
in thinking through how it should respond to some situation, an
agent needs to perform some calculation. Even though the answer
is predetermined, the agent must still do the calculation to deter-
mine the answer. Searle (2001) offers the following scenario:
Imagine that you are in a restaurant and you are given a choice
between veal and pork, and you have to make up your mind. You
cannot refuse to exercise free will. [It makes no sense to say] “Look,
I am a determinist—que sera sera—I’ll just wait and see what I
order.” . . . We cannot think away our free will. (p. 494)
Long ago, Augustine of Hippo (391–395) raised a similar ques-
tion. Why is one responsible for one’s choices even though God
has foreknowledge of one’s choices? His answer: Everyone has the
power to make his own decisions; that is no less true even though
God knows what one will decide.
The essence of this argument is that even if one agrees that the
laws of nature predetermine the outcome of any thought process,
one cannot refuse to do the thinking—if the possibility of refusing
to do something is even coherent in the context of determinism.
Deterrence and Free Will
The discussion so far provides a rationale for implementing
deterrence against criminal behavior, whether or not agents have
free will.
The traditional argument is that if agents have free will, deter-
rence can be effective. That argument holds even for the sort of
free will espoused by Dennett and Baumeister—the ability to think
ahead before acting. An agent that can anticipate negative conse-
quences can refrain from taking actions that produce those conse-
quences.
But, the argument also goes, agents without free will are not
responsible for their behavior. For them, deterrence will be inef-
fective. That is not the case. As we saw, agents may be repro-
grammed by their experiences: An agent that sees lawbreaking
being punished may reprogram itself not to break the law. That is
the case even if the act of self-reprogramming does not rely on free
will.
AlphaGo illustrates this phenomenon. No one would claim that
computer systems have free will—other, perhaps, than the ability
to think ahead. Yet AlphaGo reprograms itself on the basis of what
are effectively rewards and punishments based on its actions. The
result is that it reprograms itself to act “properly,” that is, to play
winning moves and to win games. Since deterrence works with
computer systems, there is no reason to believe it will not work
with biological systems, free will or not.
Consciousness
None of the preceding mentioned consciousness. No need was
found to distinguish between biological and computer-based
agents. This is not to argue either (a) that computers have what
most people would regard as consciousness or (b) that there is no
such thing as consciousness. I strongly encourage efforts to de-
velop a scientific understanding of subjective experience—which I
take to be synonymous with consciousness. I find myself conclud-
ing, however, that meaning and autonomy do not require con-
sciousness. Yet I do not dismiss the relevance of consciousness for
meaning. Consciousness makes meaning come alive, adding to it
awareness, depth, richness, and intensity, both conceptual and
emotional.
In my view, free will requires consciousness in two ways:
a) Like qualia, free will is a subjective experience.
b) It is not clear what it would mean to attribute free will to
an agent without consciousness.
Searle (2010) characterizes free will as a response to experienc-
ing three causal gaps: between reasoning and deciding, between
deciding and initiating an action, and between initiating an action
and (if the action spans an extended period) seeing it through. But,
as Searle says, these are gaps in subjective experience, that is,
consciousness. I agree that understanding free will as commonly
understood will depend on understanding consciousness, which
seems to me the greater mystery.
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Summary
To summarize, I would emphasize the following:
• Meaning involves the transformation of symbols, that is,
abstractions, into physical actions.
• Although computers and biological organisms do this reg-
ularly, such transformations are quite extraordinary. Sym-
bols are nonmaterial, not subject to the laws of physics.
Yet agents’ physical behaviors depend on their symbol-
processing rules.
• Because these rules are internal, I call such agents auton-
omous.
• Because these rules are often inaccessible to outside ob-
servers and because they may depend on the agent’s
history, it may not be feasible to predict an agent’s
behavior.
By acting physically in response to symbols, autonomous agents
link the abstract to the material.
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